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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID W. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 16417 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a 
corporation, and JOSE F. 
GONZALES, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal From the Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Christine M. Durham, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages for personal injury sus-
tained by Plaintiff arising from a motor vehicle collision involv-
ing Plaintiff and Defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company moved for sununary judgn1ent in this matter alleging it 
was not negligent and if it was, its actions were not the proxi-
mate cause of Plaintiff's injury. The lower court granted said 
Defendant's motion for sununary judgment, no cause of action. 
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The lower court certified the order granting summary judgment 
under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. as a final judgment. Plaintiff and 
Defendant Gonzales have reached a settlement in this matter and 
a stipulation and order of dismissal between said parties has 
been filed in the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the sununary 
judgment granted in favor of Defendant Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company and that the case be remanded to the trial 
court for the purposes of a trial on the merits in this matter. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 8, 1977 Plaintiff was traveling north on 
State Road 111 on a motorcycle and approaching the intersection 
of State Road 171. Plaintiff regularly passed through this inter-
section on his way to work for the past three years and it was 
Plaintiff's habit and custom to drive 50 miles per hour on the 
highway and slow to 30 miles per hour as he passed through the 
intersection (Jensen depo. pp. 8,59,60) At approximately the 
same time, Defendant Gonzales was in the process of executing a 
left hand turn from Hightway 111 and attempting to proceed east 
on Highway 171, at which time Plaintiff collided with Defendant 
Gonzales' vehicle. On this particular occasion, Defendant Moun-
tain States Telephone and Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell) had 
parked a van-type truck, 18 feet long by 8 feet wide directly 
in the center of the intersection. (Sortino depo. pp. 15,33,28) 
The employee of Defendant Mountain Bell who parked the truck was 
aware that a person making a left hand turn as Defendant Gonzales 
did would have his view obstructed. (Sortino depo. p. 30) De-
fendant Mountain Bell provided no signs, flagmen or other devises 
to warn Defendant Gonzales that he was approaching a hazardous 
situation. (Gonzales depo. pp. 8, 29) As Defendant Gonzales 
came to the intersection and moved into the left hand turn lane 
he was unable to see traffic approaching in the opposite direction 
because of Defendant Mountain Bell's truck being parked in the 
center of the intersection, although he would have been able to 
-3-
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see Plaintiff approaching had said truck not been so parked, 
(Gonzales depo. pp. 29,30) While proceeding slowly beyond 
Mountain Bell's truck far enough to see approaching traffic, 
Defendant Gonzales had moved his vehicle into the approaching 
path of Plaintiff and a collision between Plaintiff and Defend-
ant Gonzales occurred. (Gonzales depo. p. 14) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S BURDEN ON APPEAL, 
In order for the moving party to prevail on a motion 
for sununary judgment, it must show that the evidence presented, 
when viewed in a light most favorable to the opposing party, does 
not present a material issue of fact, and that the evidence so 
viewed entitles the moving party to have his motion granted as 
a matter of law. This test is well settled in Utah and expressed 
in many cases including Controlled Receivables, Inc. vs. Harman, 
17 Utah 2d, 420 (1966) 413 P.2d 807. 
The Appellant's burden on appeal is to show that the 
evidence presented to the lower court, viewed most favorably 
for the Appellant, presents a material issue of fact which must 
be resolved to determine the liability of Mountain Bell. 
POINT II 
STATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE 
NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT MOUNTAIN BELL. 
Defendant Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment 
was argued in the lower court without the presence of a cour: 
reporter. Therefore no transcript of the hearing exists althou~i 
-4-
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the transcript of the subsequent hearing on Plaintiff's motion 
to alter or amend the summary judgment is a part of the record 
on appeal. At both hearings, it was conceded by the attorney for 
Defendant Mountain Bell, that for purposes of summary judgment, 
it was conceded that Mountain Bell was negligent and the arguments 
presented were solely related to the issue of proximate cause. 
(Tr. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment, p. 2, ln. 20-27) 
Although the negligence of Defendant Mountain Bell was 
conceded for purposes of said Defendant's summary judgment motion, 
the alleged negligent acts of Mountain Bell will be briefly set 
out in this brief. Like any other individual or entity, Defend-
ant Mountain Bell has a duty to exercise reasonable care for the 
safety of others during the conduct of its business as a public 
utility. The breach of that duty consists of Mountain Bell's 
action of placing its truck directly in the center of the inter-
section, blocking the view of Defendant Gonzales, Plaintiff and 
other traffic. In so parking its truck, Defendant Mountain Bell 
created a dangerous condition recognized by Utah law: 
"The parking of a vehicle upon the paved 
or traveled portion of a highway is generally 
regarded as a hazard to traffic thereon." 
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 
2d 143, 147; 263 P.2d 287, 290 (1953) 
In addition to the hazardous situation created, Defend-
ant Mountain Bell failed to take the precautions required by law 
and its truck was therefore illegally parked. Defendant Mountain 
Bell provided no warning devices to advise Defendant Gonzales of 
the danger. Defendant ~ountain Bell provided no flagmen to 
-5-
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control traffic at the intersection, although flagmen could have 
been so used and were, in fact, used at that location by Moun-
tain Bell the following day. 
Pursuant to the rule making power of the Utah State 
Road Conunission, the Utah manual for Construction and Mainten-
ance Traffic Control was adopted on July 14, 1972. The relevant 
portions of that manual are attached to Plaintiff's memorandum 
in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Sec-
tion 6-05.1 of the manual requires that all traffic control de-
vices used on highway construction and maintenance work shall 
conform to the specifications in the manual. The portion of the 
manual entitled "Typical Applications" contains the required 
traffic control devices for utility operations. Defendant Moun~ 
tain Bell did not provide the warning signs as required by the 
manual. The manual requires that operations which restrict ve-
hicular movement, so that traffic in both directions must use 
a single lane, shall only be allowed while flagmen are on duty 
or when a temporary traffic signal is installed to assign right-
of-way. Mountain Bell neither provided a flagman nor installed 
such a traffic signal, although vehicles in both directions were 
required to use a single lane due to the position of Mountain 
Bell's truck parked on the highway. (Sortino depo. p. 28,29) 
The manual further provides that for operation within 
50 feet of an intersection, traffic control plans shall be 
approved by the district engineer for the Department of Highways. 
(Sortino depo. p. 62,63) Defendant Mountain Bell obtained no 
-6-
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such approval. 
Because of the foregoing acts and omissions of Defend-
ant Mountain Bell, said Defendant breached its duty to Plaintiff 
creating a dangerous condition and by not taking the precautions 
required by law for the safety of those traveling upon a public 
highway. The deposition of Mountain Bell's employee, Terry A. 
Sortino, states that Mountain Bell's truck was in fact parked 
in the center of the intersection blocking the view of traffic. 
(pp. 15,28,30,33) 
This evidence being before the lower court created 
an issue of fact as to the negligence of Mountain Bell. 
POINT III 
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT MOUNTAIN BELL'S NEGLIGENCE 
WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY IS 
A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE RESOLVED AT TRIAL. 
Defendant Mountain Bell contends that because Defendant 
Gonzales made a left turn in front of Plaintiff, that the negli-
gence of Defendant Gonzales was the intervening proximate cause 
of Plaintiff's injuries; and, therefore, the negligence of Moun-
tain Bell was not a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. 
However, the risk created by Mountain Bell in obstructing the 
intersection included the foreseeable negligence of Defendant 
Gonzales. The court in Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702 (1978) 
refused to uphold jury instruction which read, in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
"If a driver creates a dangerous condition 
with a motor vehicle, but his condition is 
such that another driver, exercising reason-
able care, should have observed and avoided 
-7-
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the dangerous condition, then the negligence 
of the latter driver is an independent 
intervening cause, and, therefore, the 
first driver cannot be a proximate cause 
of the collision." 
The facts in Watters consisted of defendant's automobile stopping 
abruptly in front of the plaintiff, and although plaintiff was 
able to stop without colliding with that defendant, a vehicle 
following plaintiff was unable to stop and collided with the 
rear of plaintiff. The court in considering the defendant's 
liability for the collision with the rear of plaintiff's vehicle, 
rejected the above jury instruction and stated the following 
rule: 
"The more fundamental test is whether under 
the particular circumstances he should have 
foreseen that his conduct would have exposed 
others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and 
this includes situations where negligence or 
other wrongful conduct of others should be 
reasonably anticipated." 
Applied to the case at hand, the question becomes 
whether or not Defendant Mountain Bell should have foreseen that 
its conduct would have exposed Plaintiff to the unreasonable risk 
of Defendant Gonzales moving into the path of Plaintiff because 
his vision was obstructed. 
Before the accident occurred, Defendant Mountain Bell's 
employee Sortino, during a 30 minute period, saw six vehicles 
traveling east and driving around the front of Defendant Mountain 
Bell's truck. (Sortino depo. p. 36) Defendant Mountain Bell 
was therefore fully aware that motorists proceeding easterly in 
the intersection were doing so even though said Defendant Moun-
-8- rd 
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tain Bell's truck obstructed their view of oncoming traffic. 
(Sortino depo. pp. 28-30) While it could be argued that every 
such motorist was negligent, it can not be said that the subse-
quent conduct of Defendant Gonzales in repeating what other 
drivers were doing was unforseen by Mountain Bell. 
The case of Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 
2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953) is in accord with Watters and the 
court at page 148,9 cites with approval the following rule of law: 
"The earlier of the two wrongdoers, even 
though his worng has merely set the stage 
on which the later wrongdoer acts to the 
plaintiff's injury, is in most jurisdic-
tions no longer relieved from responsibility 
merely because the later act of the other 
wrongdoer has been a means by which his 
own misconduct was made harmful. The test 
has come to be whether the later act, which 
realized the harmful potentialities of 
the situation created by the defendant, 
was itself foreseeable." 
The facts in Hillyard involved Defenant's truck being parked so 
that it protruded onto the highway. Plaintiff negligently failed 
to see the truck and Plaintiff's vehicle ran into the truck. The 
court in applying the above rule of law to the fact situation 
stated: 
"If, however, the evidence is susceptible 
of any reasonable interpretation which would 
permit a finding th~t as [plaintiff] approached 
the scene, his view was so obstructed by the 
cars he was following and passing that at 
the time the third car turned to its left 
to miss the truck the latter loomed up 
before him as an emergent situation, then, 
even though he was negligen~ in getti~g 
into such a predicament, a JUry ~uestion. 
would exist as to whether the prior negli-
gent parking of [defenda~ts] truck.was 
also a concurring cause. (emphasis added) 
1 Utah 2d at 152 
-9-
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Applied to the case at hand, even though Defendant Gonzales was 
negligent in proceeding when his view was obstructed, a jury 
question exists as to whether Defendant Mountain Bell's prior 
negligent parking of its truck was a concurring cause of Plain-
tiff's injuries, 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR 
BY NOT VIEWING THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT IN 
A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF. 
At the hearing of Plaintiff's motion to amend judgment, 
the court made the following corrunents concerning the granting of 
the summary judgment: 
"I do have one concern, Mr. Roberts, and that 
is: In granting the summary judgment, I did 
so on the basis and the understanding that 
there were no material disputed issues of 
fact, and my determination of that was based 
upon my understanding of the evidence in the 
case, which was that the defendant Gonzales, 
knowing that he could not see around the 
truck, made an attempt to complete a left 
hand trun. If, in fact, he attempted to 
get a better view by inching out around 
the truck, my view of the facts would have 
been entirely different." (p. 12, ln. 5-14) 
The court stated that its view of the case regarding the actions 
of Mountain Bell and the question of proximate cause depended 
on a determination of whether Defendant Gonzales attempted to 
complete a turn knowing he could not see around Mountain Bell's 
truck, or whether Defendant Gonzales attempted to get a better 
view by inching out around the truck. Such a slight distinction 
in the interpretation of the facts was not a proper determination 
for the trial court on a summary judgment motion. The evidence 
-10-
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before the court consisted of the deposition of Defendant Gonzales 
wherein he stated as follows: 
"Q. After you stopped you told me a few minutes 
ago that you came to a full stop because there 
was some sort of traffic sign controlling you 
and that your vision was blocked. Then what 
did you do? 
A. Then I proceeded slow until I cleared this 
utility truck enough so I could see what was 
coming from the south." (p. 11, ln. 25-p. 12 
ln. 5) 
The court in construing the statements of Defendant Gonzales 
made a determination that he attempted to complete a left hand 
turn as opposed to inching out around the truck, a determina-
tion which the court thought was central to its decision. If 
any such determination was proper for the court, a view of the 
facts allowing Plaintiff to go to trial would be the only way 
to resolve conflicts in the facts on summary judgment. 
The lower court further made a determination that the 
actions of Defendant Gonzales were, as a matter of law, negligent 
and more over the type of negligence that Mountain Bell could not 
have foreseen under any circumstance. Plaintiff respectfully 
submits that a determination of the foreseeability of the actions 
of Defendant Gonzales is an issue of fact which should not have 
been determined by the trial court. At the hearing on Plaintiff's 
motion to amend judgment the court made the following statements: 
"I agree with you, Mr. Dibblee, that the question 
in this case is whether or not Mountain Bell should 
have foreseen Gonzales' negligence is one of 
fact. I determined in the negative, i.e., it 
was a question of law based on the facts that 
were before me and the evidence that the kind of 
negligence that is engaged in by Gonzales in 
making that turn when he literally had no view 
and knew he had no view, in other words, he was 
-11-
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fully apprised of the hazard, was the kind of 
negligence that Mountain Bell could not have 
foreseen under any circumstance. In other words, 
they have no reason to believe that a driver who 
knows he doesn't have a view is going to attempt 
to cross two lanes of traffic in the absence of 
that view." (p. 13, ln. 7-19) 
Plaintiff submits that the deposition of Mountain Bell employee 
Sortino is evidence that Defendant Gonzales' conduct was forsee-
able. In that deposition Mr. Sortino stated: 
"Q. The position that your truck was in, a 
person traveling intending to get in the 
left hand lane of traffic to make a left 
turn, their view would be obstructed, is 
that not true? 
A. Partially. 
Q. Your were aware of that? 
A. Yes. n (p, 30 ln, 1 - 7) 
"Q. How many cars drove around the front of 
your car while you were sitting there at 
lunch? 
A. Around the front of the van? 
Q. Yes, going east. 
A. In 30 minutes I would probably 
say half a dozen." (p. 36 ln. 5 - 9) 
The statements of Mountain Bell employee Sortino concern his 
observations and activities prior to the collision, and indicate 
that traffic was proceeding through the intersection in spite of 
the fact that Mountain Bell's van had created an obstruction of 
vision in the intersection. It could be argued that all such 
drivers proceeding through the intersection were negligent but 
even if so, Mountain Bell was aware that traffic was so proceeding 
and the action thereafter of Defendant Gonzales in pulling his 
vehicle just beyond Mountain Bell's van to get a better view, 
cannot be said to be an unforeseeable event. To rule tll.a t Defend-
ant Gonzales' actions were unforeseeable as a matter of law 
-12-
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required the lower court to disregard or give no weight to the 
evidence presented in Mr. Sortino's deposition. Plaintiff re-
spectfully submits that such a view or weighing of the evidence 
on summary judgment is an improper function of the trial court 
and reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff received severe injuries as a result of the 
hazardous situation created. In a negligence action such as this, 
the issues of negligence and proximate cause must be determined 
by the trier of fact after each party has introduced and developed 
the evidence supporting his case. Plaintiff submits that to de-
termine the issue of proximate cause by holding that the actions 
of Defendant Gonzales were not foreseeable as a matter of law, 
is an invasion of the province of the fact finder. Plaintiff 
has presented a prima facie case showing that Defendant Mountain 
Bell created a hazardous situation by blocking the view of traffic 
and Plaintiff has further demonstrated through the deposition of 
Mountain Bell employee Sortino that Mountain Bell was aware that 
traffic was proceeding through the intersection in spite of the 
hazard. Plaintiff respectfully submits that he is entitled to 
a trial on the issues of negligence and foreseeability and requests 
that the Court remand this case to the lower court for that purpose. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE 
By JAMES R. SOPER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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